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INTRODUCTION

In the 1970s, a "microloan movement" began with the Grameen Bank
in Bangladesh.' Between 1980 and 1998, microcredit provided by Grameen
Bank and others helped over 10 million Bangladeshis rise out of poverty.2
Those microloans, often of less than $100, have helped individuals and
individual families earn a better living than they would have been able to earn
otherwise.3 The difference of $100 may seem trivial, like "chump change" to

I
Betsy Cummings, Tiny Loans Stimulate the Appetite for More, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 27, 2005),
www.nytimes.com/2005/01/27/business/tiny-loans-stimulate-the-appetite-for-more.html.
2
Microcreditin Bangladesh "Helped 10 Million," BBC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.
bbc.com/news/business-I 2292108.
See Nivedita T. Dwivedi & Tanya Mishra, Impact of Microcredit Services on
Socioeconomic Status of Women Entrepreneurs, 2 VOICE RES. 46, 46 (2013), http://www.voiceo

fresearch.org/Doc/Sep-2013/Sep-2013_1 .pdf.
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Americans;4 yet, to entrepreneurs in many developing countries, that difference
can be enough to rise from poverty to relative prosperitZ through the purchase
and use of materials and equipment for a small business.
Because the dollar amounts loaned to individuals are so small when
compared to first-world notions of relative wealth, the potential returns on the
loans to the microcredit lender and the returns on the capital provided to the
borrower are likewise small, making it less likely that a first-world investor
would engage in such lending. Similarly, because governments would likely
expend more money in tracking these businesses for proper registration and
taxation than they would receive in tax dollars, these microfinanced businesses
most often operate in the "informal economy." 7
Every nation's economy has an informal sector.8 In developed
countries, the informal sector's share of the gross domestic product ("GDP")

4
The phrase "chump change" frequently appears in stories about microlending in the
popular media of developed countries. See, e.g., id.; Harry Eagar, Chump Change, MAUI NEWS
(Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.mauinews.com/page/blogs.detail/display/2721/Chump-change.html;
How to Help Africa Help Itself, BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2003), http://www.businessweek.com
/stories/2003-07- 10/how-to-help-africa-help-itself.
s
Alyce Lomax, Tiny Loans, Tremendous Returns: Tales from the Microlending Frontier,
DAILYFINANCE (Mar. 7, 2012, 12:46 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2012/03/07/microloanspower-small-business-success-stories/. The article details the impact of $200 loans for two Costa
Rican entrepreneurs. Id. One bought equipment for a bakery run out of her home; the other
bought materials for garment making, which she also does from home. Id. The loans gave the
entrepreneurs the capital they needed to create and sustain successful at-home businesses. Id.
6
For example, a Swiss citizen (of the first world) brings home, on average, $5,682.71 per
month, and a Bulgarian citizen (of the developing world) brings home, on average, $483.00 per
month. Rankings by Country of Average Monthly Disposable Salary (Net After Tax) (Salaries
and Financing), NUMBEO, http://www.numbeo.com/cost-of-living/country_price-rankings?
itemld=105 (last visited Apr. 13, 2016). These two investors will have very different ideas about
what each expects from her return on investment and, thus, of which investments are worth each
one's time. See Opportunity Cost, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/
opportunitycost.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2016). That is, the Swiss citizen and the Bulgarian
citizen will assign different values to the same $10, as that dollar amount represents just 0.18% of
the Swiss's take home salary, but 20.7% of a month's salary for the Bulgarian-making the $10
more valuable to the Bulgarian, relative to her existing wealth. See id. Additionally, because an
investor incurs transaction costs with each investment made, it only makes sense that an investor
will choose fewer and larger investments as opposed to many smaller investments to avoid those
costs. See Michael S. Barr, Microfinance and FinancialDevelopment, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 271,
283 (2004) ("[T]he transaction costs in lending small amounts to lots of poor borrowers are
high."); Transaction Cost, BUSINEssDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.businessdictionary.com/defi
nition/transaction-cost.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016).
7
See Gary M. Woller & Warner Woodworth, Microcredit as a Grass-Roots Policy for
International Development, 29 POL'Y STUD. J. 267, 267 (2001). The concept of the "informal
economy" is developed infra Part II.A.

Annette Tomal & Lacey Johnson, EarningsDeterminantsfor Self-Employed Women and
Men in the Informal Economy: The Case of Bogotd, Columbia, 83 INT'L Soc. Sci. REv. 71, 71
(2008).
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may be quite small and may be seen in unreported wages of day-laborers or the
availability of cheaper goods produced by companies paying lower than the
minimum-wage-cash wages, for example.9 In developing countries, the
informal sector may be much more pervasive and may be seen in most small
businesses at every level, from ownership and management to labor.'o
The informal sector presents some of the same problems to developed
developing
countries: for example, the potential for human rights abuses is
and
prevalent where labor conditions are not regulated, and the disparity between
taxes paid and benefits received is worsened where taxes are evaded by some.
These problems, though, are much more consequential in developing countries:
where more of a population labors without meaningful regulation, abuses are
more likely, and where more of a population evades taxation, those that are
taxed pay more than their share relative to the benefits they receive. Because of
these and other problems, there is great call for the formalization of informal
economies in developing nations.
Formalization, though, is not automatically or even easily achieved for
most informal sector participants." First, there is the question of whether an
informal sector participant will choose to formalize, where that option is
available-answering this question requires a cost-benefit analysis for a given
informal sector participant.12 Second, there is the question of whether an
informal sector participant has the means to formalize-answering this
question requires, among other things, an analysis of what is required of an

9
See Saskia Sassen, The Informal Economy: Between New Developments and Old
Regulations, 103 YALE L.J. 2289, 2298 (1994) ("The consumption needs of the low-income
population are met in large part by small manufacturing and retail establishments that rely on
family labor and often fall below minimum safety and health standards. Cheap, locally produced
sweatshop garments, for example, compete with low-cost Asian imports."); Guillermo Vuletin,
Measuring the Informal Economy in Latin America and the Caribbean 3 (Int'l Monetary Fund,
Working Paper No. WP/08/102, 2008), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp081
02.pdf (offering the example of New Zealand as having "a low share of informal activity," with
around 12% of that State's GDP).
1o
See Benjamin Temkin, Informal Self-Employment in Developing Countries:
Entrepreneurshipor Survivalist Strategy? Some Implicationsfor PublicPolicy, 9 ANALYSES Soc.
ISSUES & PUB. POL'Y 135, 136 (2009) (discussing how some analysts include "street vendors as
well as self-employed individuals owning microenterprises, their salaried employees and unpaid
relatives" among the informally employed); Vuletin, supra note 9, at 3 (offering the example of
Bolivia, the informal sector of which at one point represented approximately 65% of that State's
GDP).
"
See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV. REMOVING BARRIERS TO FORMALIZATION: THE CASE FOR
REFORM AND EMERGING BEST PRACTICE 11-20 (2005) [hereinafter EMERGING BEST PRACTICE],
http://www.oecd.org/dac/povertyreduction/38452590.pdf.
12
See Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar, Informal Economy: Is It a Problem, a Solution, or Both? The
Perspective of the Informal Business 6-10 (Northwestern Univ. Sch. L., L. & Econ. Papers,
Paper No. 1, 2006), http://law.bepress.com/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=5065&context-expresso.
This question is addressed infra Part II.B.
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informal sector participant to enter the formal economy in a given State,1 3 "with
regulatory and administrative barriers standing out as a particular concern." 1 4
This Note is primarily concerned with those barriers.
Presently, individual States develop mechanisms for formalization on
an individual basis, developing States needing mechanisms more extensive than
those in the developed world, which aim primarily to collect taxes owed and
ensure minimal safety standards.' 5 While the "states as laboratories" 6 approach

In this Note, "State" (capital "S") refers to a sovereign State on the international stage, as
compared to those "states" (lowercase "s") like West Virginia or California that comprise a
federal State like the United States of America.
13

14

See EMERGING BEST PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 11. This question is addressed infra Part

III.
1

For example, Bolivia, Nigeria, and Ghana are each taking different paths toward
formalization. Bolivia has attempted to formalize its historically large informal sector by the use
of a Non-Governmental Oranization ("NGO") engaged in microlending purposively transitioning
into the formal sector by becoming a government-regulated, commercial bank. See generally
Damian von Stauffenberg, Inter-American Development Bank, How Microfinance Evolves: What
Bolivia Can Teach Us, 4 MICROENTERPRISE DEV. REV. (July 2001), http://services.iadb.org

/wmsfiles/products/Publications/1481944.pdf (describing the movement toward and process of
NGOs engaged in microlending transitioning into the formal sector itself). Nigeria is beginning
to formalize its informal economy in response to the ever-growing number of micro- and smallbusiness entrepreneurs: the government is setting up a Nigeria Employers Consultative
Association to handle microlending to Nigerians and to start a bank specifically designed to
handle those entrepreneurs. See Informal Sector Crucial to Nigeria'sEconomic Devt, Says NECA
DG, VANGUARD (July 17, 2014), http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/07/informal-sector-crucialnigerias-economic-devt-says-neca-dg/ [hereinafter VANGUARD]. Ghana's rural banks are
following a traditional route in order to get their informal sector clients to formalize-albeit
solely to collect more money themselves-by going out daily to collect the savings of their
clients and deposit them nightly in the banks. See Robert Palmer, Formalizing the Informal
Economy: Best Practices?, NETWORK FOR INT'L POL'Y & COOPERATION IN EDUC. & TRAINING

(2007), http://www.norrag.org/es/publications/boletin-norrag/online-version/best-practice-in-edu
cation-and-training-hype-or-hope/detail/formalizing-the-informal-economy-best-practices.html.
16
The idea of "states as laboratories" was popularized in the United States by Justice
Brandeis's opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). Justice Brandeis
wrote,

To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a

laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.

Id. The idea underlying this notion is that the competing "experiments" will respond to the
particular circumstances present in the particular states and will yield the most data from which a
decider (the federal government for Justice Brandeis) can choose the "best" option to apply
uniformly across the system.
Here, the States (capital "S") are not a part of a federal system, but are parts of the
international system and sovereigns themselves. Sovereign States may also, of course,
experiment in their own cultural, political, economic, and social systems within the limits
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definitely has merit as it allows for varied approaches, a more uniform
approach is desirable. Because most formal economies are interconnected and
interdependent, regardless of geographic location, this Note argues that a
uniform means of facilitating both the extension of banking services to
informal sector participants and the entry into the formal sector of the same
may yield more benefits to all parties of interest, from individuals to local and
national governments.
This Note proceeds, in Part II, by describing the informal economy and
the motivations of those active in that economy. Part III examines potential
barriers to formalization. Part IV explores some alternative financial structures
that have developed at the individual State level to encourage economic
development toward formalization. Part V.A explains why formalization is a
worthy end to pursue, both from the perspective of the individuals working
informally and from the perspective of governments seeking to regulate their
internal economic, social, and legal workings. Part V.B then argues that a
supranational structure would be best able to facilitate the transitioning of
particular informal participants into the global, interconnected, and
interdependent formal markets by standardizing the formalization process
itself. Finally, Part V.C recommends some particulars to guide the development
of such a supranational body, specifically drawing on the experience of
microcredit presented in Part IV. Encouraging formalization is necessary to
alleviate many of the problems presented in developing nations with regard to
human rights and economic development, generally. The following sections
explore the reasons for and arguments against the entrenched informality in
many markets around the world.
II.

THE INFORMAL ECONOMY

Participation in the informal economy comes with tradeoffs, some
benefits for some costs. An informal market participant will participate in that
market where the costs of formalizing outweigh the benefits. In other words, an
informal market participant will not formalize unless he sees enough value in
that prospect to justify the costs in terms of money, time, and opportunities lost.
Before getting to this cost-benefit analysis that every informal, and formal,
market participant should engage in, however, Part II.A examines just what is

prescribed by international law. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration of Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operations Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625, at 6 (Oct. 24, 1970),
www.un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm ("Every State has an inalienable right to choose its
political, economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another
State."). States, therefore, are legally able to pursue very different courses regarding any policy
that does not violate international law. Id. Varied approaches by States at the international level
thus fall in line with Justice Brandeis's conception of "states as laboratories." See Liebmann, 285
U.S. at 311.
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meant by "informal economy." Part II.B then explores the motivations of those
who choose to operate informally and the motivations of those who operate
formally who, nonetheless, choose to keep the informal market operating.
A.

What Is the Informal Economy?

One way to define the informal economy is to contrast it with the
formal economy: the formal economy consists of all sectors of the economy
that are taxed, regulated, or have formal oversight.17 The informal economy,
then, encompasses everything else. Depending upon the context and time,
however, reference to the "informal economy" has any of several meanings. It
is a relatively new concept that, in a popular sense in the United States and in
most developed States, is largely perceived in one of two ways: as the black
market, including economic activity related to drugs, prostitution, and other
illegal activities, or as a grayer market, where day laborers exist off the books
and waitresses underreport cash tips. 19
For less developed countries, the concept has a longer history and a
less easily summarized subject matter. The idea of an informal economy was
first introduced by Keith Hart when studying urban labor markets in Ghana in
the 1970s. 20 Hart based his distinction between "formal and informal income

1
See R. Duane Ireland, 2012 Program Theme: The Informal Economy, ACAD. MGMT.,
aom.org/meetings/annualmeeting/past-meetings/theme2012.aspx?terms=r (last visited Feb. 21,
2016) (defining the formal economy as being "comprised of commercial activities that a
governing body taxes and monitors for society's benefit and whose outputs are included in a
country's gross domestic product").
18

HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD

xi-xii (June Abbott trans., 1989) [hereinafter DE SoTo, THE OTHER PATH] ("The 'informal
economy' is usually thought of as a problem: clandestine, unregistered, illegal companies and
industries that pay no taxes, that compete unfairly with companies and industries that obey the
law and pay their taxes promptly.").
19
See Richard A. Epstein, The Moral andPracticalDilemmas of an Underground
Economy,
103 YALE L.J. 2157, 2157 (1994) ("All sorts of activities, some desirable and some unsavory, are
part of the underground economy. The physician who takes cash for a Saturday office visit is
working off the books; so is the waiter who reports some but not all tips as income; so too is the
maid who pays no taxes on her wages. But the underground economy is far more vast than these
examples suggest, for it embraces much more than the unreported, unrecorded, or informal
economy. It includes industries that rely on illegal aliens and businesses that are completely
outlawed, such as the trade in narcotic drugs." (footnote omitted)).
20
Alejandro Portes, The Informal Economy: Perspectivesfrom Latin America, in EXPLORING
THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY: STUDIES OF ILLEGAL AND UNREPORTED ACTIVITY 147-48 (Susan

Pozo ed., 1996) (discussing Keith Hart's Informal Income Opportunitiesand Urban Employment
in Ghana, a paper presented at the Conference on Urban Unemployment in Africa, sponsored by
the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, in September 1971 (subsequently
published in revised form in 11 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 61 (1973)). Keith Hart is an anthropologist
and economist, teaching as Centennial Professor, International Development & Anthropology, at
the
London
School
of Economics.
Academic
Staff
LSE:
INT'L DEV.,
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opportunities" on wage income and self-employment because only some types
of enterprises, those which are wage based, "are amenable to enumeration by
surveys, and-as such-constitute the 'modem sector' of the urban economy.
The remainder . . are ... classified as 'the low-productivity urban sector,'
which had previously been discounted as negligibly contributing to income
growth. 2 1 To Hart, the study of the economies of developing countries "ha[d]
been impeded by the unthinking transfer of western categories to the economic
and social structures of African cities."22 Hart found that, when denied success
by the formal opportunity structure-because of inflation, inadequate wages, or
a surplus of labor, for example-people sought informal means of increasing
their incomes by "emulating the role of the small-scale entrepreneur." 2 3 Hart's
conception of the informal economy thus argued for the study of this segment
of the population in determining the productivity of economies because, as Hart
concluded after identifying its lack of attention, the "'reserve army of
underemployed and unemployed' in towns may or may not be the economic
disaster it is often thought to be." 2 4
Once introduced to the world, Hart's characterization of the informal
sector was redefined and institutionalized within the International Labour
Office ("ILO") bureaucracy as synonymous with poverty, eventually becoming
known as the "excluded" sector in less developed economies in the ILO, World

http://www.1se.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/people/Index.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
His study of informal economies in Ghana is considered a seminal work in the field. See, e.g.,
AHMED MOUNIR SOLIMAN, A POSSIBLE WAY OUT: FORMALIZING HOUSING INFORMALITY IN
EGYPTIAN CITIES (Univ. Press Am. ed. 2004). "The invention of the term informal sector is
generally attributed to Keith Hart in his seminal article 'Informal Income Opportunities and
Urban Employment in Ghana,' published in 1973." Id. at 24.
21
Keith Hart, Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana, 11 J. MOD.
AFR. STUD. 61, 68 (1973).
22
Id. at 61.
23
Id. at 67.
24
Id. at 88. Another scholar who has challenged this characterization is Hernando de Soto.
De Soto's The Other Path is considered by many a seminal work in law and development
scholarship. See Kevin E. Davis, The Rules of Capitalism, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 675, 675 (2001)
(reviewing HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE? (2000) [hereinafter DE SoTo, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL]).

Like Hart, de Soto concludes that the informal sector's members' energy and importance are
downplayed by government statistics. DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 18, at xxii. De
Soto's conception of "informals" is one in which members of that group "live within a gray area
which has a long frontier with the legal world and in which individuals take refuge when the cost
of obeying the law outweighs the benefit," noting that "[o]nly rarely does informality mean
breaking all the laws." Id. at 12. De Soto portrayed informal enterprise in Peru as an "irruption of
'real' market forces in an economy straightjacketed by favoritism and [SItate regulation" and
encouraged the dismantling of State regulatory barriers so that popular entrepreneurship could
flourish. Portes, supra note 20, at 149.
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Bank, and other studies over the next 15 years.25 That characterization, though,
has been consistently challenged by Hart and others who view the informal
sector as "people taking back in their own hands some of the economic power
that centralized agents sought to deny them." 2 6 Thus it is within States where
some segments of the population tend to be denied access to the means to
generate or retain economic power that informal economies develop most often
and become institutionalized components of the formal market itself. The next
section explores the motivations of those who operate informally to so operate
and the motivations of those who operate formally to keep the informal market
operating.
B.

Where (and Why) Are Informal Economies?

A concise answer to this question is that informal economies develop
where the benefits promised by informality outweigh the costs to those
individuals engaging in economic activity informally. 27 Every nation,
regardless of wealth or level of development, has an informal economy. 28
Those in the developing world are much more prominent than those in most
developed countries. For example, in Third World and post-Communist States
transitioning to market economies, 80% of some populations may exist as

25

ALEJANDRO PORTES, ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY: A SYSTEMATIC INQUIRY 132 (Princeton Univ.

Press ed. 2012).
26
Keith Hart, The Idea ofEconomy: Six Modern Dissenters, in BEYOND THE MARKETPLACE:
RETHINKING ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 137, 158 (Roger Friedland & A. F. Robertson eds., 1990).
Another school characterizes the informal economy as being comprised of "income earning
activities unregulated by the state in contexts where similar activities are so regulated." Portes,
supra note 20, at 148 (citing Manuel Castells & Alejandro Portes, World Underneath: The
Origins, Dynamics, and Effects of the Informal Economy, in THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: STUDIES
IN ADVANCED AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 11 (Alejandro Portes et al. eds., 1989)); see also

Edgar L. Feige, Defining and Estimating Underground and Informal Economies: The New
InstitutionalEconomics Approach, 18 WORLD DEV. 989 (1990). That characterization suggests
unified interdependent systems involving many points of intersection between the formal and
informal economies. Portes, supra note 20, at 149. This school sees the informal economy as
complementary to the formal economy, enhancing the profitability of the formal sector by
reducing the cost of inputs and increasing the "yield" of wages earned in the formal economy
with the provision of cheaper-than-otherwise-possible goods and services. Id. at 150, 162.
27
See Belal Fallah, The Pros and Cons of FormalizingInformal MSEs in the Palestinian
Economy 12 (Palestine Econ. Policy Research Inst., Working Paper No. 893, 2014). The basic
calculation for a given individual thinking of formalizing a business is, essentially, "a profit
maximization decision." Id.
28
Tomal & Johnson, supra note 8, at 7 1.
29
See Brett J. Miller, Living Outside the Law: How the Informal Economy Frustrates
Enforcement of the Human Rights Regime for Billions of the World's Most Marginalized
Citizens, 5 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 127, 128 (2006).
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"informals" 30 and, in some States, the informal economy accounts for over 50%
of GDP. 3 1
According to the ILO, it is a fact that "the larger part of the world's
working population earns its livelihood under the vulnerable and insecure
conditions of the informal economy." 3 2 Not including employment in
agriculture, which would significantly increase the following percentages,
approximately 65% of employment in developing Asia, 51% in Latin America,
48% in North Africa, and 72% in Sub-Saharan Africa exists in the informal
economy.33 Informal economies typically include small-scale business
activities in traditional sectors.34 According to the ILO, most jobs created
today, in many parts of the world, are informal, including both selfemployment and informal wage work.
Although the particular contours of informal sectors vary by country,
many develop where "the system is administered in a corrupt, incoherent,
exorbitantly expensive, discriminatory or elitist manner" because the laws do
not adequately protect all of the members. That "incoherence" derives from
the notion that "the law must reflect the heterogeneous social realities of its
people."
Where the local circumstances in a developing nation do not match
those notions, "the result is a system of governance that drives people into
informality based on its incoherence." 3 8 Informal economies thus may develop
where Western nations influence and encourage development based on notions
developed in the context of social realities that are markedly different from
those present in the developing country. For example, in Hernando de Soto's
study of Peru, he found that in order to legally register a shop, an entrepreneur
would have to spend 289 days, working six hours a day, at a cost equal to 36
times the Peruvian monthly minimum wage-those registration requirements

Id. (citing DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 24, at 15-16).
Id. at 128-29. In 2000, de Soto reported that underground markets accounted for 50% of
GDP in Russia and Ukraine and 62% of GDP in Georgia; that "85% of all new jobs in Latin
America and the Caribbean have been created in the informal sector"; and that only 10% of the
workforce in Zambia was legally employed. DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 24,
at 69.
30
31

32

INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, BACKGROUND DOCUMENT, THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: ENABLING

TRANSITION TO FORMALIZATION 1 (2007) [hereinafter BACKGROUND DOCUMENT], http://www.ilo.
org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed-emp/@emp_policy/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_12548
9.pdf.
33
Id at 7.
34
id.at.

35

Id

36

Miller, supra note 29, at 129.

37

Id at 130.

38

Id.
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bore no relationship to the economic realities of the vast majority of
Peruvians.39 Informal economies may also develop where the incoherence
results from a lack of trust in a corrupt regime and, therefore, a lack of trust in
the laws it produces.4 0 In post-Soviet States not long after partition, for
example, those citizens who did not trust the institutions that were largely still
run by the very same bureaucrats that had run the prior regime participated in
some aspects of the informal economy.4 1
Informal economies develop and thrive all over the globe.42 Although
informal markets develop in every nation, regardless of GDP or other economic
measures, informal markets develop most substantially in States that do not
adequately provide for their populations.43 In short, no matter the peculiar
circumstances of any given case, an informal economy will develop where the
benefits promised by informality outweigh the costs to an individual engaging
in an economic activity informally.4
1.

The Benefits of Operating Informally

In weighing the benefits against the costs of formally or informally
operating, both economic and noneconomic factors are judged.45 Economic
motivations relate to "unemployment and an inflexible formal labor market[,]
the declining real price of capital[,] and the high cost of formal production. A 6
Non-economic motivations relate to "a greater flexibility and greater

3

See

SUSAN J. WINTERBERG, STILL ON THE OTHER PATH? THE IMPACTS OF BUSINESS

FORMALIZATION IN PERU AND THEIR LESSONS

FOR SME DEVELOPMENT POLICY 4 (2005),

https://www.academia.edu/1384164/. Still_on_the_OtherPathThejImpacts ofBusinessForm
alization inPeru and theirLessons forSMEDevelopmentPolicy.
40
See Claire Wallace & Rossalina Latcheva, Economic Transformation Outside the Law:
Corruption, Trust in Public Institutions and the Informal Economy in Transition Countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, 58 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 81, 82 (2006) (finding "a connection between
participation in the black economy [of several States in Central and Eastern Europe] and the lack
of trust in public institutions (both political and legal institutions as measured by two indexes)");
Nabamita Dutta et al., Informal Sector and Corruption:An Empirical Investigationfor India 16
(Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 5579, 2011), http://ftp.iza.org/dp5579.pdf
(finding, in a study of the States of India, that a "rise in corruption unambiguously raises the size
of the informal sector when we identify [S]tates with [State Domestic Product] lower than a
critical level").
41
See Wallace & Latcheva, supra note 40, at 84.
42
Tomal & Johnson, supra note 8, at 71.
See generally Miller, supra note 29, at 128.
See Fallah, supra note 27, at 12.
45
See Klarita Garxhani, The Informal Sector in Developed and Less Developed Countries,
120 PUB. CHOICE 267, 278-79 (2004).
46
See id. at 278.
43
4
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satisfaction in work[,] a complete use of [one's] professional qualifications[,]
and the increased leisure time." 47
The most easily identified benefits of operating informally are those
economic factors exposed when contrasting the various costs necessarily paid
by formal market participants. The taxes and withholdings, registration and
licensure fees, and any spending for compliance, specifically, that must be paid
by formal market participants are not paid by those operating informally. 48
Several studies have put numbers to the cost of formality: for example, studies
of Peru, Costa Rica, and Argentina found the cost of operating fully within the
law, as compared to the cost of operating informally, to be between $590 and
$1,231 per month, $3,600 per year, and $1,000 to start a business,
respectively. 49
Additionally, the time formal market participants spend toward
accounting for or paying any of those costs, as well as the time spent
registering the business or its employees and complying with regulations, is not
spent by those operating informally.5 0 In Ecuador, for example, the basic
process for registering a business can take 141 days.5 1 The average for all Latin
American States for the basic registration of a business is 97.2 working days,
requiring 13.5 procedures to register.52 The benefit to those who do not engage
in such onerous registration lies in the opportunity costs they save by not
standing in line, essentially, for days on end.53 To state this differently, those
who do go through such registration processes lose the value of all the
opportunities they have lost while registering.54
Another major benefit to those operating informally arises because
informally operated businesses are, by definition, not subject to regulations

See id.
See Martha Alter Chen, Rethinking the Informal Economy: Linkages with the Formal
Economy and the Formal Regulatory Environment 4 (U.N. Dep't Econ. & Soc. Affairs (DESA),
Working Paper No. 46, 2007); see also Fallah, supranote 27, at 6 ("Registering a business often
entails completing several requirements related to screening, health and safety, environment, and
tax registration.... The burden of registration also includes the time it takes from start to
finish.").
49
Tor Jansson & Geoffrey Chalmers, The Case for Business Registration Reform in Latin
America, INTER-AM. DEV. BANK 4 (2001) (citations omitted), http://publications.iadb.org/bit
stream/handle/i 1319/4999/The%2OCase%20for%20Business%20Registration%20Reform%20in
%20Latin%20America.pdfsequence=l.
5o
See id. at 9, tbl. 2.
5'
Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
52
Id. at 9, tbl. 2. These numbers are for only the basic registration requirements: If a
business needs special permitting, is subject to an excise tax, or operates in foreign trade, for
example, "then the number of procedures and amount of time [required to] register [a business]
increase significantly." Id. at 8.
5
Id. at 4.
54
Id.
47
48
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formally operated businesses become subject to through registration and
compliance. Therefore, the owners of informally operated businesses often
employ informal wage-earners who are willing to be paid in cash, perhaps even
at a cheaper rate, unreported to the government and therefore not subject to any
taxation or withholding.55 This gives the owners of informally operated
businesses two advantages. First, the cost of labor to the owner will be lower
than the cost of labor would be in a formally regulated business, increasing his
profits. Second, because the cost of labor is less for the owner of an informally
operated business, the product or service of the business can be offered at a
discount from the price a formally operated business would have to charge for
the same product or service.56 Because of this discount, the owner of the
informally operated business may garner a larger share of the market than he
would otherwise receive, increasing his profits.
One potential benefit of operating informally that is not necessarily
economic arises when an individual decides not to pay into the tax base
because of "a lack of any trust in the way taxes are spent." 57 Where the
government loses the trust of its population, "a step into the twilight economy
will be taken much more easily." 5 8 If an individual's values are such that this
negative action would be a benefit to himself, operating informally will come
that much more easily.5 9
Scholars have identified several predominant reasons informal market
participants have mentioned for their participation in the informal economy,
including the evasion of taxes and legislation related to labor conditions,
quality regulations, and production limits. 60 An increase in any of these
transaction costs of participation in the formal economy would make it
"relatively more appealing to switch to the informal sector." 61 Depending on
the ease of access to the formal economy, the benefits of operating informally
can be significant, especially for those whose earnings do not go far above
maintaining the family's subsistence. 62 Any benefits from informally operating,
of course, will be weighed against the costs of operating informally.

ss

Rita K. Almedia & Pedro Carneiro, Enforcement of Regulation, Informal Labor and Firm

Performance 8-9 (Inst. for the Study Labor, Discussion Paper No. 1759, 2005), http://www.econ
stor.eu/bitstream/10419/33192/1/500644284.pdf.
56

See Michael Samers, The Myopia of "Diverse Economies," or a Critiqueof the "Informal

Economy," 37 ANTIPODE 875, 879 (2005).
5

See G6rxhani, supra note 45, at 278-79.

58

See id.

59
60

See id.
See id. at 279.

61

See id.

62

Almedia & Carneiro, supra note 55, at 8-9.
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2. The Costs of Operating Informally
Starting from the individual informal operator's perspective, several
costs are apparent. First, access to banking and credit services is limited for
those operating informally, "usually due to insufficient collateral."6 3 The
starkest example of a cost created by the lack of access to banking services is
the constant fear of having one's money stolen for a lack of a safe place to
deposit the money.64 Also, the mortgages banks give are rarely available to
informal market participants. 5 Commercial banks most often require proof of
formal income in order to qualify for a mortgage. 6 Informal market
participants, by definition, often have no formal income to report. 67 Therefore,
the mortgage as a savings and investment vehicle is not readily available to
informal market participants, limiting their ability to be financially secure,
especially in times of economic downturn.6 8 This lack of access limits the
informal operator's ability to grow her business as well as her ability to
withstand economic downturns.
The ability to grow a business is not only limited by access to credit,
though. Informal market participants must limit the size of their informal
operation for fear of detection of the informal business by government bodies.70
For example, an entrepreneur employing 50 people runs the risk of detection
because those 50 people likely will have to misreport or hide their earnings to
protect the entrepreneur and the business employing them. If even one is
See Fallah,supra note 27, at 4. While it is true that access to these services is still limited
by operating informally, NGOs and some State organizations have responded to this concern,
specifically, by offering microcredit and other services where the NGOs or State organizations
operate. See, e.g., VANGUARD, supra note 15, ¶ 11.
6
See Josaphat Kweka & Louise Fox, The Household EnterpriseSector in Tanzania: Why It
Matters and Who Cares 34 (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 5882, 2011),
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5882. Security, or the "risk of theft,"
and the lack of a safe place to keep money repeatedly came up in focus group discussions as
major constraints on informally operating business enterprises in Tanzania. Id.
65
See Oscar Sanchez, Access to Credit and the Dynamics ofInformality in Mexico 13 (InterAm. Conference on Soc. Sec., Working Paper No. WP-01 14), http://biblioteca.ciess.org:
8080/acervo/bitstream/handle/123456789/30/SG-2015-01ceditarmtadatos.pdf;jsessionid=49785
DB53CB20F29B6E974DA056C3D2D?sequence=3.
66
See id.
67
See id.
68
See id. ("Given current practice, where commercial banks require proof of formal income
as a condition for accessing home loans, it turns out that lack of ready access to these instruments
mitigates the attractiveness of formal employment; i.e., being able to own a house that not only
serves to provide a consumer good (a roof over our head), but is also an insurance vehicle that
can be accessed as well in times of economic misfortune.").
69
See id. at 12 ("[L]ack of access to credit limits firms' growth as well as their capacity to
survive economic downtrends.").
70
Fallah,supra note 27, at 4.
63
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audited (or, perhaps more likely, examined) by an authority or someone with a
duty to report suspicious financial activity to an authority, the entrepreneur will
likely be detected and may be shut down by the authorities.
Another example arises from situations where the informal business is
generating good profits. Those profits, at some point, will likely have to be
reported and formalized or the entrepreneur runs the risk of detection and fines
or other punitive measures. Where the benefits of operating informally are still
outweighed by the costs of entry into or the costs of compliance with the formal
economy, despite earning good profits, the entrepreneur has incentive to
produce less, employ less, and earn less solely to avoid detection. Further, this
fear of detection also limits informal market participants' ability to get
government support, like training or subsidy programs.7 1 This, of course, would
apply to the owners of the informal businesses, but also to the employees
earning informal, but real, wages, who would be deterred from seeking such
government support as might help them enter the formal market. Fear of
detection thus affects all informal market participants, though those who own
informal operations obviously have more incentive to hide the operation as they
profit from those operations more than those they employ.
Another potential cost in some parts of the world is the cost of any
bribes that need to be made in order to be allowed to continue to operate.72 For
example, a study published in 2000 reported that in some post-Soviet States,
bribing government officials was still the norm, in other post-Soviet States, it
was simply not uncommon. In Russia and the Ukraine, 90% of managers
reported that it was normal to pay bribes to government officials; in Slovakia,
40% of managers said they paid bribes; and in Poland and Romania, still 20%
of managers paid bribes. Those figures were distinguished by the study as
bribes paid specifically to government officials from bribes those firms paid for
"protection" to the mafia or other criminal gangs.74
Informal market participants also face, in many cases, substandard
labor conditions due to employment in an unregulated business. Sweatshops

71

Id.

Simon Johnson et al., Why Do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity After
Communism, 76 J. PUB. ECON. 495, 497 (2000).
72

73

Id.

Id. These latter bribes for "protection" would presumably still have to be paid even where
operating informally, unless the operations were so well hidden that not even the criminal
elements were aware of the economic activity ripe for exploitation.
7
James Heintz & Robert Pollin, Informalization, Economic Growth and the Challenge of
Creating Viable Labor Standards in Developing Countries 2 (Political Econ. Research Inst.,
Working Paper No. 60, 2003), http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1048
&context-peri workingpapers ("In many cases, the process of informalization is directly linked
to these concerns over human rights violations, downward pressures on poverty-level wages, or a
general erosion of working conditions. Sweatshops and factories using child labor often must
74
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and businesses employing children, for example, must generally operate
informally as the practices of such businesses are generally outlawed by
domestic laws and violate international laws concerning human rights, worker's
rights, children's rights, and labor standards.7 6 Like many other facets of the
informal economy, the effects of such practices actually spread into the formal
economy. For example, labor conditions prevalent in informal sectors of an
industry affect the labor conditions throughout the entire industry, both
formally and informally operating.77 Some describe it as a "vicious cycle" or in
terms of a "race to the bottom," where a high proportion of workers willing to
earn less in informal businesses "makes it difficult for workers to bargain for
decent wages, working conditions, and societal protections."7 Other areas
where the presence of informal markets effects societal concerns are in the
areas of health, safety, and environmental protection.79
In 2007, the ILO described the following ways that workers in the
informal economy faced "severe decent work deficits" and "precarious and
vulnerable" conditions:
[W]ork in the informal economy is often characterized by ...
unsafe and unhealthy working conditions, low level of skills
and productivity, low or irregular incomes, long working hours
and lack of access to information, markets, finance, training
and technology; workers in the informal economy are not
recognized, registered, regulated or protected under labour
legislation and social protection; workers ... in the informal

operate informally since government regulations frequently prohibit many of the most common
abuses.").
76
Such practices violate, for example, the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(2014), in the domestic law of the United States and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25, at 3 (Nov. 20, 1989), at international law.
n
See Heintz & Pollin, supra note 75, at 1.
[I]nformalization will also place downward pressure on wages and working
conditions in formal jobs as well. Thus, the process of informalization
proceeds in part through a vicious cycle: a relatively high proportion of
informal jobs makes it increasingly difficult for workers to bargain for decent
wages, working conditions and social protections, so that what had once been
formal jobs become increasingly informalized over time.
There are numerous parallels between the process of informalization and
more general concerns over worsening employment conditions and the
growing prevalence of labor abuses. For example, anti-sweatshop activism in
the countries of the global North in recent years reflects a heightened
awareness over questions of international labor standards as they pertain to
manufacturing and industrial protection. Similarly the question of child labor
has assumed a greater urgency in international organizations such as the ILO
and UNICEF.
Id.
78
Id.
7
Fallah, supranote 27, at 1.
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.

economy are generally characterized by poverty leading to
powerlessness, exclusion and vulnerability; most workers . .
in the informal economy do not enjoy secure property rights,
which does deprive them of access to capital and credit;
[workers in the informal economy] have difficulty accessing
the legal and judicial system to enforce contracts and have
limited or no access to public infrastructure and benefits; [and]
women, young persons, migrants and all the workers are
especially vulnerable to the most serious decent work deficits
in the informal economy.so

The most prominently argued aspect of the informal economy that
affects both informal and formal market participants stems from the nonpayment of taxes for money earned informally. 8' It is often argued that when
informal market participants shirk their duty to pay taxes to the government,
they are in fact "weaken[ing] government's ability to provide public services
and [are therefore] hamper[ing] economic development." 82 Although informal
market participants receive the benefit of not having to pay the tax in the first
place, these participants also have to face the cost of receiving less public
services and having to contend with slower economic development in the
community.83 Further, the taxes evaded by those in the informal economy may
be collected, or may be perceived to be collected, instead from those already
paying taxes in the formal economy.84 The perception or reality of this overtaxation of formal market participants may disincentivize those participants
from both operating in the formal market and paying their own taxes.85 Finally,
the presence of a large informal sector also tends to lower the overall
productivity of a society because of the resulting lack of economies of scale.86
Because informal market participants need to avoid detection in order to keep
operating, their businesses tend to be smaller than they would otherwise grow
to be. Because of this artificial limitation on size, these firms do not have the
purchasing power necessary to buy in bulk or dedicate labor to its most
efficient use across the firm, advantages formal firms that grow sufficiently in
the right markets do have. This limitation creates costs for both formal and

80

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT,

8'

See,

supra note 32, at 3.

e.g., THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMIES: TAX EVASION AND INFORMATION DISTORTION

(Edgar L. Feige ed., 1989).
82
Fallah, supra note 27, at 1.
83
See id.
84
See, e.g., id. at 4.
85
See, e.g., id.
86
See id.
87
See id.
88

See id.
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informal consumers and hinders economic development, generally.8 9 The
factors that affect whether businesses operate in the formal or informal
economy operate in the aggregate: that is, "What matters is how these factors
combine together."9 0
Informal economies thus exist wherever these costs are outweighed by
the benefits discussed above. That the benefit of operating informally more
often outweighs the costs in developing countries than in developed countries
seems to be a simple fact at present; that the costs remain also seems to be a
fact. 91 Because many of those costs relate to human rights abuses and
ineffective economic development, development scholarship often cites
formalization as a primary means to alleviate poverty and create the conditions
necessary for economic progress. 92
Policy discussions calling for formalization often cite these costs to the
individual and the larger costs to society as motivation for those calls. The
formal economy, it is argued, provides the regulation and oversight necessary
to correct human rights abuses, the access to credit and other banking services
necessary to secure or expand businesses, and the fair allocation and collection
of taxes necessary to provide the services that only a government can
practicably deliver.94 Calls for formalization, however, often go unanswered;
the next part explores the barriers to formalization that often explain why.

See id. Because the larger an informal business grows, the more likely it is that the
government will detect the business and, perhaps, shut down the business, informal sector
businesses tend not to grow such that the business would benefit from increasing economies of
scale. Id.
89

90

COLLIN WILLIAMS, SMALL Bus. COUNCIL, SMALL BUSINESSES IN THE INFORMAL ECONOMY:

MAKING THE TRANSITION TO THE FORMAL ECONOMY 10 (2004), http://www.academia.edu/
200717/SmallBusinessesintheinformalEconomy.
91
Scholarship in this field frequently cites the ongoing costs of operating informally,
especially in developing States, in terms of human rights, governance, and economic costs at the
societal level. See BACKGROUND DOCUMENT, supra note 32, at 3.
92
Martha Chen, The Business Environment and the Informal Economy: Creating Conditions
for Poverty Reduction 30 (Oct. 2005), http://www.businessenvironment.org/dyn/be/docs/
73/session2.lchen-maindoc.pdf (Draft Paper for Committee of Donor Agencies for Small
Enterprise Development Conference on "Reforming the Business Environment" identifying that,
in the scholarship on economic development of informal economies, "the debate on the informal
economy has focused on the question of whether to 'formalize' the informal economy").
9
See Fallah, supra note 27, at 6-8 (categorizing the policies attempting to formalize
informal economies in terms of "reducing barriers to formalization, simplifying the tax system,
enhancing enforcement, and building trust with the public").
94
See, e.g., John C. Cross, Street Vendors, Modernity and Postmodernity: Conflict and
Compromise in the Global Economy, 20 INT'L J. SOC. & SOC. POL'Y 29, 31-37 (2000) (discussing
the modem view that regulating informal behavior creates the efficiency and productivity
required to make "massive changes in [S]tate structure, market systems . .. [and the] culture and
social life of individuals, families, and communities," including aspects of life implicating human
rights and economic development).
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III. BARRIERS TO FORMALIZATION

Barriers to formalization generally fall into several categories:
regulatory barriers, administrative barriers, fees and financial requirements,
corruption in public administration, socio-cultural attitudes, lack of key
business services, and criminality.9 5 The barriers that frustrate formalization the
most are the regulatory barriers, administrative barriers, and fees and financial
requirements, along with corruption in some States.96 These areas most
significantly converge to form the barriers of taxation, business
registration/licensing, and labor law. 97
Problematic regulatory barriers are those that "comprise inappropriate
requirements and stem from a government policy-making environment" that
does not encourage entrepreneurship. 8 Those wishing to formalize in
developing countries are especially prone to regulatory barriers because of the
history of colonialism and neocolonialism:
In general, many developing countries are emerging from a
history of heavy-handed regulation, with approvals required for
even the smallest activity, and authority overly centralized and
inflexible. This means they are hampered by the legacy of a
heavily regulated economy and a command and control
approach to administration and enforcement. Years of poor
quality law-making has created a tangle of complex and
inconsistent laws that present a daunting regulatory hurdle to
the would-be formal enterprise. As such, the regulatory
systems of these countries are not well developed to support a
flourishing market economy that will create growth and formal
jobs. 99

This unique history has only frustrated the formalization process in developing
countries where formal financial services are lacking to start. 00 This history has
led to the extensive and onerous registration requirements that many scholars
cite as a factor in the decision whether to participate in the formal economy or
the informal economy.'o

95
EMERGING BEST PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 11 (citing a SIDA fact-finding study, World
Bank Doing Business reports, FIAS Investment Climate Surveys, and the SBP compliance cost
survey of the informal sector).
96
Id.

9

Id
Id. at 12.

9

Id.

'0

Id
See, e.g., WINTERBERG, supra note 3 9, at 4.
.

9

101
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Administrative barriers are the bureaucratic requirements that flow
from regulations, their implementation and enforcement.1 0 2 Even where a
regulation is efficiently designed to accommodate entrepreneurship, its
administration may prove to be a hassle, dissuading those wishing to formaliie
from doing so.' 03 Some barriers have to do with efficiency, some with the
capacity of the administering agency, and some with the abuse of power by
administrators.'0
Barriers presented by the fees and financial requirements of
formalization "are caused by regressive fees which penalize smaller firms,
overly complex tax regulations, and poor administration."' 0 5 Total costs of
registering can certainly be a problem, as well as the costs of taxation and
continuing compliance, but so too can minimum capital requirements for
businesses wishing to obtain a limited liability status be a barrier for those
wishing to formalize. 106
Many of the opportunity costs saved by operating informally, are, in
fact, barriers to the formalization of informal market businesses and capital.'0o
That is, because of the onerous requirements to legally register a business in
Peru, for example, informal market participants forego the time and money
required to complete that registration and, thus, benefit by putting those
resources to some more productive use.'0o The time and money required to
register a business in a given State, then, are barriers to the formalization of a
business.09 Where the government bureaucracy in Peru was so oppressively
endless, Hernando de Soto called his book on the phenomenon of the informal
economy, The Other Path, because the poor were effectively locked out from
the formal, legal path by the prohibitively high costs of compliance with the
law and endless streams of red tape." 0 In fact, in order to legally register a
simple garment shop, an entrepreneur had to spend an average of 289 days
working six hours a day at a cost equal to 36 times the Peruvian monthly
minimum wage.

102

EMERGING BEST PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 13.

103

105

Id.
Id
Id. at 14.

106

Id.

107

These opportunity costs are discussed supra Part II.B.2.

108

DE SoTo, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 18, at 158-72.

104

See generally Leora Klapper, Luc Laeven & Raghuram Rajan, Entry Regulation as a
Barrier to Entrepreneurship, 82 J. FIN. ECoN. 591 (2006) (evaluating the empirical effects of
regulatory barriers on the creation of new limited liability firms, the size of the new entrants, and
the growth of those firms already participating in the formal market).
110
WINTERBERG, supra note 39, at 1.
"
Id. at 4.
109
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Of course, registration and licensure fees are only the first costs
incurred; once a business becomes formalized, it incurs many more costs to
remain formal, including the costs involved with paying taxes and complying
with labor laws, health and safety laws, and any other government regulations
that pertain to the particular business.1 12 Each cost represents a barrier to
formalization.
IV. ALTERNATIVE ROUTES TO ECONOMIC PROGRESS: MICROFINANCE AND
COMMUNITY-BASED BANKS

One of the tools that has proven most effective in providing some
financial services, and thus enabling some economic progress, to those
otherwise shut out from formal financial service firms is microfinancing.'" 3
This part examines the development and uses of microfinancing and similar
locally-focused alternatives to traditional brick-and-mortar banks.
A typical transaction in microfinancing is one where a farmer seeks a
small sum from a lender for crop production or livestock rearing or, more and
more today, where an individual seeks a small sum so that individual can
purchase the capital necessary to start an income-generating business."14
either case, by paying off that loan, the individual becomes eligible to apply for
another small loan in order to continue in or grow her business." 5 For example,
112

Id. at 2.
A useful and concise definition for "microfmance," a term which may carry several loaded
meanings, for the purposes of this Note is provided below:
"Microfinance" is often described as financial services for poor and lowincome clients. In practice, the term is often used more narrowly referring to
services delivered by self-described "microfinance institutions" (MFIs) who
usually use techniques developed over the last three decades to make and
manage tiny uncollateralized loans. These techniques include group lending
and liability, pre-loan savings requirements that test clients' willingness and
ability to make regular payments, graduated loan sizes, and most importantly
an implicit guarantee of quick access to future loans if present loans are
repaid promptly.
113

ADRIAN GONZALEZ & RICHARD ROSENBERG, THE STATE OF MICROFINANCE - OUTREACH,
PROFITABILITY, AND POVERTY: FINDINGS FROM A DATABASE OF 2600 MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS

1 (2006), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstractid=1400253.
114

JONATHAN MORDUCH & STUART RUTHERFORD, MICROFINANCE: ANALYTICAL ISSUES IN

INDIA 3 (2003), http://509elmp01.blackmesh.com/sites/default/files/mfg-en-paper-microfinanceanalytical-issues-for-india-apr-2003.pdf
115

See, e.g., Microfinance/"Wezesha, " EMERGENCY RELIEF & DEV. OVERSEAS, http://erdo.ca/

microfinance-wezesha (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
In the Emergency Relief and Development Overseas's Wezesha project in the Eastern
Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, accountability and support throughout the lending
payment process are assured by the procedures followed:
Once approved, each member receives a home and business visit and goes
through a week-long pre-loan training process. After this, they receive their
loans starting at $50 USD. They repay the loan . . on a weekly basis ....
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two $200 loans to Costa Rican entrepreneurs enabled one to buy equipment to
run a bakery out of her home and the other to buy materials to make garments
from home.' 16 That small injection of capital was just what those entrepreneurs
needed to create and sustain successful businesses and earn more than they
would from wage-paying jobs doing the same types of work. 17
Microfinance focuses primarily on "alleviating poverty through
providing services to the poor."" 8 As such, it "has grown to become an
immensely popular strategy for reducing poverty."" 9 In fact, it is "one of the
principal employment creating policies of today's development industry."l2 0
Because of this focus on alleviating poverty, most microfinance
institutions are non-profit organizations dependent on government aid to
function.121 An ongoing debate exists over whether microfinance should be
self-sustaining and charging higher interest rates, diversifying services, and
becoming more efficient, 2 2 or whether microfinance "should reach deeper into
the ranks of the poor." 2 3 Also because of that focus, financial services provided
by microfinancing institutions have historically prioritized the extension of
small amounts of credit-microcredit-a practice that continues today.1 24
Microcredit lenders extend credit to borrowers that traditional banks view as
too costly, too risky, 25 or as simply not worth the investment. 126 Some
Once they repay, borrowers are eligible for another loan, up to double the
size of the previous loan.
Id.
116

Lomax, supranote 5.

1"

Id.

Barr, supra note 6, at 278.
Mikael Fridell, Microcredit and the Informal Sector on the West Bank: Do Microcredit
Activities Provide Enough Stimulus to Lead Businesses Away from Informal Sector
Characteristics? 6 (Jan. 2008) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Uppsala University), http://www.divaportal.org/smash/get/diva2:131750/FULLTEXTO1.pdf.
118

"

120

Id.

See Barr, supra note 6, at 282 & n.59. One study found that about 40% of microfinance
institutions were self-sustaining and not dependent on government dollars. That study, however,
very likely tracked the better performing institutions. Therefore, although it may not be "that the
industry as a whole is moving towards financial self-sustainability," it is arguable "that a
significant part of the best institutions are doing so." Id.
122
Id. at 279 (citing, for example, Jonathan Morduch, The Microfinance Promise, 37 J. EcoN.
LIT. 1569 (1999)).
123
Id. (citing, for example, MICROCREDIT SUMMIT, http://www.microcreditsummit.org/ (last
visited Mar. 31, 2016)).
124
Id. at 278.
121

125

Id. at 279.

See id. at 283 ("[T]he transaction costs in lending small amounts to lots of poor borrowers
are high."); Patrick Honohan, Banking System Failuresin Developing and Transition Countries:
Diagnosis and Prediction 30-31 (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 39, 1997),
http://www.bis.org/publ/work39.pdf (discussing that in developing countries, commercial and
126
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microfinance institutions, though, offer a broad range of services like
insurance, transactional services, and savings accounts, though on a small
scale. 127
Whether providing microcredit, strictly, or providing a broader range
of services, microcredit institutions use a variety of risk reduction strategies
available only in the unique environments in which such institutions
function.128 For example, there have been instances where social pressures,
including shaming, were used to increase pay-back rates on loans. 129 A variety
of substitutes for traditional collateral and legal enforcement measures have
been found in particular circumstances and those substitutes have often been
successful. 13 0 Of course, the unique environments in which microfinance
institutions operate also introduces and exacerbates some problems., 3 1 For
example, two such problems are that the default rates on microloans are often
quite high and that these institutions' decision-making and accounting
processes are not very transparent.1 32
Some of these microfinance institutions, especially those that offer
financial services in addition to the extension of small amounts of credit, are
known as credit unions. 133 Credit unions are not-for-profit financial
cooperatives, founded to correct the failure of the market to provide access to
financial services for individuals of modest means.1 3 4 Because financial
services systems are not well developed or broadly accessible in many
developing countries, credit unions arise to provide the lacking services,
offering communities financial services while capturing the savings of the
communities for their own economic growth. 135
"such banks have tended to confine themselves substantially to servicing the activities of foreign
enterprises... and the trade finance requirements of the largest domestic enterprises").
127
Barr, supra note 6, at 278.
128
See, e.g., id. at 279. Also, for an interesting discussion on the behavioral underpinnings of
some of these risk reduction strategies, see Michal Bauer, Julie Chytilova & Jonathan Morduch,
Behavioral Foundations of Microcredit: Experimental and Survey Evidence from Rural India
(Inst. Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 28/2008, 2008), http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/1041
9/83420/1/589166360.pdf.
129
Barr, supra note 6, at 279.
130
Id
131
Id. at 280.
132

Id

133

STIRLING SMITH, INT'L LABOUR ORG., INT'L CO-OPERATIVE ALL. & INT'L CONFEDERATION

20 (2006), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/
@ed.emp/@emp ent/documents/publication/wcms_094047.pdf.

OF FREE TRADE UNIONs, LET'S ORGANIZE!
134

DAVID C. GRACE, EXPLORING THE CREDIT UNION EXPERIENCE WITH REMITTANCES IN THE

1 (2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTOPCONF3/Res
ources/1 588024-1152543209834/IVD.GraceExploring thecredit union experience with re
mittances in the latin american market.doc.

LATIN AMERICAN MARKET

135

Id
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Because of the many successes of some microfinance institutions,
however, the microfinance industry has greatly expanded and continues to
expand in both scale and the number of services offered, particularly in
developing countries. 3 6 With such expansion, the need for regulation and
supervision increases to ensure the "security of the people's deposits and the
soundness of the financial market."'37 The next part thus begins from the
understanding that the microfinance industry is growing to the point where
regulation is necessary to protect the formal market, itself, from the many
negative effects resulting from the economic growth of, and subsequent
attempts to formalize by, previously informal players.
V. EASING THE TRANSITION

For reasons ranging from pure revenue generation to simply bettering
the lives of those far away, calls for formalization have been heard since Hart
and de Soto brought the informal masses into the conversation. This part argues
that, because most formal economies are interconnected and interdependent,
regardless of geographic location, a uniform means of facilitating both the
extension of banking services to informal sector participants and the entry into
the formal sector of the same may yield more benefits to all parties of interest,
from individuals to local and national governments. To do that, this part
examines the reasons for formalization, in light of the costs, benefits, and
barriers discussed above, and then proposes that a supranational structure
would best facilitate the transition from the informal economy into the formal
economy. Part V.A first explains why formalization is a worthy end to pursue,
both from the perspective of the individuals working off-book (that is,
informally) and from the perspective of governments seeking to regulate their
internal economic, social, and legal workings. Part V.B then argues that a
supranational structure would be best able to facilitate the transitioning of
particular informal participants into the global, interconnected, and
interdependent formal markets by standardizing the formalization process
itself. Finally, Part V.C recommends some particulars to guide the development
of such a supranational body, specifically drawing on the experience of
microcredit presented in Part IV.

136

See Mathurin Founanou & Zaka Ratsimalahelo, Incentives, Supervision and Regulation of

Microfinance Institutions in the Developing Countries 1 3 (Munich Personal RePEc Archive,

Paper No. 41428, 2012), http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41428/.
m

See id.
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Why Formalize?

Microcredit, at present, is one of the best proven means by which
individuals can truly better their own economic circumstances., 38 But it is not
enough.1 39 As it is real people that are affected, the most persuasive evidence is
perhaps anecdotal: in India, where the microcredit movement really began-a
movement that won its sponsors a Nobel Peace Prize-several people have had
to sell blood and even organs to repay loans they took from microlending
companies. 14 0 That is to say nothing of the fact that there is little empirical
evidence that "microcredit borrowers, on average, commonly, directly, and
quickly escape poverty, as many assume."14' Thus, since the best thing we have
got is not good enough, scholars and advocates for change call for something
else-they call for formalization of the informal economies in which so many
work for too little in substandard conditions.1 42
The calls for formalization of informal economies propose everything
from lessening regulation of the formal system to the level of the informal, to
various schemes proposing the coexistence of the two systems, to intensifying
regulation of the informal system to the level of the formal-thereby
subsuming the informal into the formal.1 4 3 The experience of developed nations
is part of the impetus for these calls as the formalization process "has very
much been an integral part of the general economic development of
industrialized countries."'" Often, the call comes from the top-down where a
government seeks reform, and seeks more tax dollars, among other goals.1 45

See supra Part IV.
139
See Aneel Karnani, Employment, Not Microcredit, Is the Solution (Ross Sch. of Bus.,
Working Paper No. 1065, 2007), http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/494
19/1065-Kamani.pdfsequence=1&isAllowed=y (arguing that because microenterprises have
little capital and no scale economies, the businesses do not offer much potential to alleviate
poverty).
140
See, e.g., Sophie Song & Sreeja Vn, Perils of Microfinance: Why the Miracle Economic
Strategy, Winner ofa Nobel Prize, Failedto Turn the Poor into Entrepreneurs,INT'L Bus. TIMES
(Dec. 13, 2013, 8:42 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/perils-microfinance-why-miracle-economicstrategy-winner-nobel-prize-failed-turn-poor-entrepreneurs;
The Bangladesh Poor Selling
Organs to Pay Debts, BBC: NEWS (Oct. 28, 2013, 8:38 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-24128096.
141
Steve Beck & Tim Ogden, Beware of Bad Microcredit, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept. 2007, at
20, 20, https://hbr.org/2007/09/beware-of-bad-microcredit.
142
See supra Part II.B.2.
143
See, e.g., Cross, supra note 94, at 45-46.
138

Fridell, supra note 119, at 5.
See VANGUARD, supra note 15, $ 11; see also Christopher Woodruff, Registering for
Growth: Tax and the Informal Sector in Developing Countries 4 (CHRISTOPHER WOODRUFF,
'"
145

CAGE-CHATHAM HOUSE, REGISTERING FOR GROwTH: TAX AND THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 4 (2013), http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/cent
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Other, more altruistic calls come more from the bottom-up where development
scholars and organizations like the ILO seek to improve the lives of the
working poor across the globe.1 46 No matter the motivation, many of the same
reasons for formalization are cited. 147
The case is generally made, for example, that governments will
generate more tax revenue in the long term, creating the potential for a more
prosperous society, if formalization is undertaken. 148 Governments have always
taken action to affect the size of the informal sector in order to counter the
societal costs described in Part II.B.2.1 4 9 Burkina Faso, for example, created a
special minimal tax for those who had never previously paid taxes, to try and
shift them from the informal sector to the formal sector.15 0 Nigeria, too, has
created a special council charged with developing small, informally operated
businesses in order to grow its economy in the long term.'s
The case is also generally made that the lives of those involved in the
informal economy will improve through formalization.15 2 As "work is central to
people's well being," improving work conditions is often cited as a driving
motivation for formalization.' 53 Recently, the ILO has focused on advancing a
concept termed "Decent Work."l5 4 The concept was developed by government
representatives, employers, and workers, and recognizes that work is "a source
of personal dignity, family stability, peace in the community, democracies that

res/cage/onlinepublications/briefing/chj854 cage woodruff bp_09_07_13_web.pdf ("Inducing
firms to register so that they pay taxes is an important motivation for governments.").
146
See BACKGROUND DOCUMENT, supra note 32, at 1-3 ("In the context of the global decent
work deficits, breaking out of informality is increasingly seen as the principal development
challenge across regions. The issue is central to realizing decent work as a global goal and for all
workers, for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and for promoting a fair
globalization.").
147
Because the question of formalization involves the motivations of individuals as well as
governments, most arguments will cite incentives for all interested parties to formalization. See,
e.g., Fallah,supra note 27, at 4-5.
148
See, e.g., Jane Ihrig & Karine S. Moe, Lurking in the Shadows: The Informal Sector and
Government Policy, 73 J. DEV. EcON. 541, 541-42 (2004).
149
Id.

ISO
1
152

Id.

See VANGUARD, supra note 15, 111.
See, e.g., GLOBAL FAIRNESS INITIATIVES,

ROADMAP TO

ECONOMIC FORMALIZATION:

(PILAR) IN GUATEMALA AND NICARAGUA 5 (2009),
http://www.globalfairness.org/SiteArchives/downloads/PILARRoadmapEng.pdf.
153
Fact Sheet: Decent Work Country Programme, INT'L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/@asia/@ro-bangkok/@ilojakarta/documents/publication/wcms 116896.pdf.
154
Decent Work Agenda: Promoting Decent Work for All, INT'L LABOUR.
ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/newyork/at-the-un/general-assembly/general-assembly-third-committee/social
-development/WCMS_315057/lang-en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2016).
PROMOTING INFORMAL LABOR RIGHTS
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deliver for people, and economic growth that expands opportunities for
productive jobs and enterprise development.""' The decent work agenda
includes job creation and training, guaranteeing rights at work, extending social
protection, and promoting independent workers' and employers' organizations
to advance the social dialogue. 56 Because problems that arise in the informal
economy "cut[] across all four pillars" of the decent work agenda,
formalization of the informal economy has been a central focus for the ILO.'1 7
While the decent work agenda is pursued primarily by the ILO, other
international organizations and States aiming to reform in similar ways pursue
the same goals as those set out by the LO."' For example, in Ghana, Kenya,
and South Africa, specific policy initiatives have been introduced to take action
on employment and poverty reduction with reference to informal activities.1 59
Likewise, other regional meetings in Latin America and Asia have also
addressed the problem of formalizing the informal economy in terms of poverty
reduction.160

The individual's perspective must never be forgotten, of course, as selfinterest will drive any workable plan for formalization.' 6 1 Many argue that
formalization will bring significant benefits to informally operating
entrepreneurs, from access to capital to grow a business to better benefits for
their employees and society in general.' One argument is that businesses in
the formal economy receive protections under the law, enabling businesses to
promote themselves without fear of State reprisal, to enter into long-term and
enforceable contracts, and to gain access to government support programs.' 63 A
second argument is that the government's policies will better reflect the
entrepreneur's needs and those of society, thanks to more comprehensive
information about the private sector.'
Many reasons thus exist to attempt to formalize informal economies.
The existence of informal economies will likely never entirely cease, despite
even the most successful attempts at formalization, as evidenced by the
existence of informal economies in even the most developed countries with the

155
156

Id.
Id.

157
158

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT, supra note 32, at

164

Id

7.

See id. at 5-8.
159
See id at 5.
160
See id. at 5-8.
161
See discussion supra Part II.B.2; see also Fallah, supra note 27, at 12 (The basic
calculation for a given individual thinking of formalizing a business is, essentially, "a profit
maximization decision").
162
See Jansson & Chalmers, supra note 49, at 1; see also discussionsupra Part II.B.1.
163
Jansson & Chalmers, supra note 49, at 1.
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highest quality of governance and services.16 5 Nevertheless, formalization
should be available to those informal market participants who do choose to
formalize.1 66 The availability of the opportunity to formalize, however, is
limited by regulatory and administrative barriers, discussed in Part III. The next
section proposes that a means of getting around many of those barriers and of
tipping the cost-benefit analysis toward engagement in the formal market lies in
the development of a supranational body that would provide a uniform
transition experience for informal market participants to formalize.
B. A SupranationalBody Would Be Best Able to FacilitateTransition into
the Global FormalEconomy
As of 2005, some 30 States were either currently implementing or
planning to implement formalization programs based on Hernando de Soto's
Peruvian model of streamlining business registration requirements and focusing
on individual property rights.1 67 Other States, like Nigeria, are formulating their
own creative responses to the problems presented by the informal economies
that exist domestically.1 68 Although these local approaches should create
solutions that best fit the particular problems in each State, 169 they are not
designed to provide the best means for transitioning the informal businesses
and capital created at the local level into the formal structures common among
developed States at the global level. In a world where the global economy is a
reality, where geographically distinct markets are interconnected and
interdependent,1 70 there should be a more uniform approach to formalization
than that which exists today.171
The very real problems of those involved in the informal economy are
best addressed at the local level, by organizations or initiatives focused on

For a discussion of the motivations of informal market participation in even the most
developed countries, see Gdrxhani, supra note 45, at 276-79.
166
See supra Part V.A for some humanitarian and economic reasons that the opportunity to
enter the formal market should be extended to all.
165

167

WINTERBERG, supra note 39, at 1.

See generally VANGUARD, supra note 15 (describing the Nigerian government specifically
developing a bank to handle the needs of the many micro- and small-business entrepreneurs in
the State).
169
See supra note 16 for a discussion of how the "states as laboratories" approach will yield
responses best fit to the particular conditions of the respective states serving as laboratories.
170
See, e.g., Paul Hirst, The Global Economy-Myths and Realities, 73 INT'L AFF. 409, 409
(1997) ("It is widely accepted by academics, journalists and politicians of all shades of opinion
and in many countries that we now face the challenge of a truly globalized economy.").
171
Marina Primorac, The Global Village: Connected World Drives Economic Shift, INT'L
MONETARY FUND (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/NEWO
83012A.htm ("As the world becomes ever more multipolar and interdependent, multilateral
solutions are needed to fight the risks and reap the rewards of integration.").
168
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alleviating poverty and improving conditions. The transition into the formal
economy, however, would be best addressed by a body above the local and
even national levels. A supranational approach could set uniform minimum
standards to which individual States or NGOs involved with advancement or
reform of informal economies could look for guidance. These standards should
be made available to every bank or financial services firm, no matter how
informal, showing the businesses and their constituents what is, in fact,
expected before one can interact with the institutions that comprise the global
formal economy.
Such standards could.limit the extent to which many of the barriers to
formalization frustrate the process, currently.17 2 Uniformity of standards for
firms wishing to transition would provide the necessary information for the
firm to plan a move from informal practices to the formal practices mandated
for entrance into the global economy. For example, firm A may be operating
informally because it is in a State with little or no meaningful governance, a
corrupt State. Firm B may be operating informally because the domestic
registration requirements are too burdensome and regulations lax, making it
unnecessary to properly register and enter whatever formal market is operating
in the State. If firms A and B can access information about the agreed upon
standards for a firm's entry-agreed upon by developed, formal economy
participants in the global community-into the formal firms of the global
economy, then firms A and B can circumvent domestic issues and bank
wherever they choose, if they can prove to those institutions that they meet the
standards provided.
Of course, this would seem to require that firms A and B meet the
standards, themselves, before they would be granted access to formal
economies. More realistically, however, firms A and B would operate with
informal financial services firms or as part of community-based banks in their
respective States before acquiring (and saving) the means to engage in formal
economies. It is this intermediate level of governance that can best be leveraged
by a supranational body setting rules and monitoring outcomes.
Uniformity of regulations and reporting practices for intermediate
administrators of formalizing firms at the local or national levels would provide
firms and governments in formal economies a systematic means of measuring
almost endlessly diverse markets and firms. For example, community bank C
and small, relatively informal microlending firm D each have 20 clients.
Community bank C operates in a region of a State where over 90% of people
work in agriculture. Microlending firm D, on the other hand, operates in the
capital city of a State heavily dependent on manufacturing. Community bank
C's clients are paid seasonally and use the bank primarily for savings
accumulation. Microlending firm D's clients are paid weekly and use the firm
to borrow small amounts of capital for their side businesses, collateralizing

172

See supra Part III for a discussion of those barriers to formalization.
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their weekly earnings. Uniform regulations and reporting practices for the
administrators of community bank C and microlending firm D would provide
the supranational body, and then the formal firms and institutions, a means by
which to compare the seemingly disparate business models and clientele of
both bank C and firm D.
After some time, these reports would provide a pool of information
statistically significant enough to identify outliers, providing an effective and
efficient means to monitor so many small players across the globe.' 7 3 National
and regional trends could be identified by one body charged with oversight.
Emerging markets could be identified more quickly by the sheer number of
individuals and firms attempting to formalize, giving formal market
participants better information about where and in whom to invest. Failing
markets could also be more quickly identified and better-targeted assistance
programs may be delivered where needed.
This approach does raise the possibility of the exploitation of emerging
markets by formal market participants. However, if the supranational body
were charged with a mission similar to the overwhelming majority of
microlending organizations-that is, to "alleviat[e] poverty through providing
services to the poor" 74 that possibility becomes less threatening. Exploitation
becomes even less distinct a possibility if this supranational organization were
put under the auspices of an internationally accountable organization, such as
an arm of the United Nations. A supranational body such as this could usefully
provide consistent encouragement and oversight of the formalization efforts of
individual firms, forward-thinking communities, States, and NGOs active in
this area. Such oversight should limit the corruption barrier to formalization.
Specifically, the creation of an NGO that specializes in facilitating
transition into formal economies would allow those NGOs focused on
improving the daily circumstances of those in the informal economy to focus
on those particular efforts. It would allow each NGO to put their resources
toward the areas in which they have the most expertise, making each more
efficient in pursuit of its particular mission.
This would continue, to some extent, the current "states as
laboratories" practice where States or NGOs help individuals and firms take the
first steps toward meaningful formalization through creative solutions tailored
to particular regions or communities. That would allow for the most efficient
17
In statistics, the probability that the result of a given experiment or study can be attributed
purely to chance decreases as the number of discreet data points increases. See Statistical
Significance, DICTIONARY.coM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/statistical+significance
(last visited Mar. 31, 2016). A result is "statistically significant" when that probability is very
low. Id. Thus, the data collected from disparate and geographically diverse businesses and
markets would provide a pool from which analysts from formal institutions could draw to
determine whether a given individual, business, or market has met or substantially complied with
the standards prescribed. See id.
174
Barr, supra note 6, at 278.
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local solutions to immediate problems of those in the informal economy to be
effectively managed. It would also, though, provide those wishing to transition
into 'the formal economy with an expert and accountable body acting as a
middle-man of sorts to guide them toward formalization into the global
economy. This middle-man could make its expertise available to States, NGOs,
or even individual people or businesses wishing to transition into and make the
most of the global formal economy.
Of course, because of the sheer size of the informal economies of some
States, accounting for 50% of GDP and perhaps 80% of some populations,1 75
what is proposed here does not seek to eliminate all informal economies around
the world. Rather, what is proposed is merely a system in which those who seek
formalization can more easily achieve it.
The next section recommends some particulars to guide the
development of such a supranational body, specifically drawing on the
experience of microfinance and community-based banking presented in Part
IV.
C. Existing MicrofinancePracticesShouldBe Leveragedto Facilitate
Entry into the GlobalFormalEconomy
As developed in Part IV, the microfinance industry is growing to the
point where regulation is necessary to protect the formal market from the
negative effects resulting from the formalization process itself. Because of the
need for regulation in this area and the utility that microfinance and formal
bank alternatives provide to those most in need of the protections that follow
from participation in the formal market, this section argues that the proposed
supranational organization should work with-and provide oversight of-those
institutions and organizations active in providing microfinance services to
leverage their expertise and local focus for the benefit of those populations both
seek to serve. The proposed supranational organization should, therefore, be
guided by the experiences of the institutions of whatever size and function that
do the day-to-day work with informal populations. Currently, many of those
institutions are microcredit organizations.
As the microfinance industry continues to expand, it is believed by
some that microfinance institutions, with proper regulation, "will become selfsustainable and achieve massive outreach."'77 The supranational body proposed
would regulate the industry to help the industry and individual organizations
develop toward that end. Further, where the right conditions exist and any such

175
176
17

See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.
See Founanou & Ratsimalahelo, supranote 136,
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institutions do become self-sustaining, some believe that these institutions can
be easily formalized and integrated into the formal financial sector.17 1
This may be desirable in order to efficiently move a significant number
of participants or blocks of capital, served by the institution, into the formal
economy. It may also, however, deprive remaining informal market participants
of the learned expertise of that organization. In either case, the proposed
supranational organization would be in the best position to either facilitate
formalization or the development of another microfinancing institution in the
area potentially now-deprived of such service.
Further, if the proposed supranational body provided oversight of these
institutions, especially in sectors of the economy that are repressed or illfunctioning, there would only be increased opportunities for the poor to "build
assets, increase price competition and drive down interest rates, and lay the
groundwork for banking sector development should legal institutions take
root." 79 Some suggest that formal institutions like traditional banks "develop

successfully only if a sufficiently large demand for bank loans materializes."'
Therefore, microfinance institutions may be the necessary precursors to formal
institutions taking root in an area. Likewise, credit unions as alternatives to
formal banks seem to be natural precursors to more formal institutions
participating as formalization begins. Thus, encouraging these types of
practices to continue, but to be regulated under uniform standards, seems a
promising incremental step toward formalization of the discrete communities in
which the microfinance and other alternative institutions are active.
The approach argued for in this Note addresses Hart's conception of
the informal sector as "people taking back in their own hands some of the
economic power that centralized agents sought to deny them"' 8 ' because the
proposed supranational organization should be guided by a humanitarian
mission, similar to the mission of many microcredit organizations, in seeking to
achieve positive economic effects. This proposal is made so that the informal
market participants, themselves-that is, the people working without industry
regulation, safety codes, adequate pay, etc.-may see the benefits of industry
regulation, codes, pay, and other regulable aspects that are more likely to result
where the economy develops, generally.
VI. CONCLUSION

Because most formal economies are interconnected and interdependent,
regardless of geographic location, a uniform means of facilitating both the
extension of banking services to informal sector participants and the entry into
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the formal sector of the same may yield more benefits to all parties of interest,
from individuals to local and national governments. This Note proposes that a
supranational organization accountable to a humanitarian mission statementsomething to the effect of "to alleviate poverty by encouraging and facilitating
access to formal market institutions by those in developing markets"-would
be best positioned to facilitate informal market participants' transition toward
formal markets.
That organization could leverage existing arrangements between
microcredit and other community-based banking alternatives and their
clienteles. It could leverage its position to provide uniform standards downward
to those clienteles to inform them of the particular formal market institution's
requirements for access. It could leverage its position to provide a standardized
means by which to judge seemingly disparate businesses upward to the formal
market institutions seeking new business.
Informal economies present problems to global economic development
because those economies, by definition, are removed from the economies of the
most advanced countries, those countries best able to help alleviate the severe
conditions largely present in those places where informal economies develop
and thrive. Extensive scholarship and simple logic demonstrate that where the
benefits to be had by operating informally outweigh the costs of so operating,
people struggling to survive day-to-day will almost always choose to operate
informally. The proposal, here, is that a supranational body accountable to
humanitarian principles would facilitate formalization in a way that best
accounts for both humanitarian and economic interests of formal and informal
market participants alike. This approach may yield more benefits than would
otherwise be achievable to all parties implicated, from individuals to local and
national governments. Such an approach, this author hopes, would fill coffers
and stomachs all over the world.
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